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THE DANGERS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Rebecca J. Berkunt
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure restricts an employee's future
employment if that employee will inevitably use a former employer's trade
secrets in the course of the future employment. This principle is not new,
but the number of courts applying it has risen in recent years. The Seventh
Circuit case PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond' has led to the doctrine's increased
popularity in trade secrets cases in several states. Since this 1995 case, the
doctrine has been expressly adopted by many states, including
Pennsylvania, and thus has become a new factor with which employers and
employees must contend.
Inevitable disclosure has serious ramifications for the employment and
intellectual property worlds. On one hand, a strong policy exists in many
states for freedom of employment and employee mobility, thus favoring the
rights of employees over employers. Intellectual property rights, however,
rival these policies as employer trade secrets deserve protection under
intellectual property laws. As a result, there is a tension between freedom
of employment and protection of trade secrets. Inevitable disclosure favors
the latter of the two policies and thus shifts the balance of power toward
employers. The doctrine can act as a covenant not to compete or in place
of a non-disclosure agreement. In this way, the doctrine is effectively a
fallback provision for employers who neglected other means of trade secret
protection. Employers who were careless during their hiring process or
contractual negotiations are now equipped with the inevitable disclosure
safety net. This gives an incentive to employers to be more cavalier in not
protecting their trade secrets ahead of time and seriously hinders employee
mobility and freedom of contract.
t J.D. 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B. 2000, University of
Michigan.
1. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The doctrine also has serious potential for abuse when used as a
litigation maneuver. As with many litigation tactics, inevitable disclosure
can become a tool for employers to bide their time. This is especially true
in technical fields where time is of the essence. Employers can bring
litigation under the guise of inevitable disclosure. Then, through a
preliminary injunction, employers can protect their trade secrets until the
secrets have become outdated due to superior technology. In the meantime,
the employer has the power to restrict the employee's freedom to work in
certain capacities.
In Pennsylvania, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure was expressly
2adopted in the 1982 case Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson.
However, Pennsylvania has since been reluctant to apply the doctrine
because of the state's history of favoring employee mobility. Since the
doctrine limits freedom of employment, Pennsylvania courts have hesitated
to find instances of inevitable disclosure.
Consonant with Pennsylvania's pro-employee policies, Pennsylvania
has not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)-an act that favors
employers. Consequently, Pennsylvania does not appear ready to alter its
support of employee freedom.
This comment will address the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in
Pennsylvania. Section I delineates the three definitions of trade secrets and
how they compare with each other in light of Pennsylvania's trade secret
law. Section II delves into the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, examining
the PepsiCo case and its application in several subsequent cases. Section III
focuses on Pennsylvania's treatment of the doctrine and outlines a number
of Pennsylvania cases addressing the issues behind inevit4ble disclosure.
Finally, Section IV is an attempt to understand why Pennsylvania is
reluctant to apply the doctrine it expressly adopted. This section examines
Pennsylvania employment policies and delineates Pennsylvania's specific
interpretation of the doctrine. This section also explains how inevitable
disclosure might negatively affect employees in Pennsylvania and
determines that the doctrine must continue to be narrowly interpreted and
applied.
I. TRADE SECRETS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Trade secrets may include any information that is not generally known
and that has value to a competitor.3 This may include software, techniques,
2. 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
3. Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Mark A. Konkel, Protecting Employer Secrets and the
"Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure," 650 PRAC. L. INST., LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 411,431 (2001).
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plans, designs, details about customers, or any combination thereof.4 The
three major definitions of a trade secret are found in the Restatement (First)
of Torts, the UTSA, and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
Pennsylvania follows the original definition of trade secrets found in
the Restatement (First) of Torts.5 Trade secrets were first defined in this
6restatement in 1939. The definition states that "[a] trade secret may
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."7 Along with the
definition, the drafters included six factors to help determine whether
something qualifies as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of
the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of
effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.8
These factors guide Pennsylvania courts applying the Restatement (First)
definition of a trade secret.9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1979, did not
mention trade secrets at all.1 ° Rather, the UTSA was published that same
year, and it contained this definition of trade secrets:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
4. Id. at 431-34.
5. See First Health Group Corp. v. Nat'l Prescription Adm'rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d
194, 217 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that Pennsylvania uses the definition of a trade secret
found in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939)).
6. John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 145, 147 (1998).
7. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
8. Id.
9. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985) (using the
six factors to help determine if certain information is a protectable trade secret).
10. Nathan Hamler, Note, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
and Negative Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secrets Law Headed in the Right Direction?, 25 J.
CORP. L. 383, 386 (2000).
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reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
This definition bears a close resemblance to the Restatement (First) of
Torts definition but differs from it in three ways.' 2 First, the UTSA does
not require a trade secret to be "in use" as the Restatement (First) does.
13
Second, under the UTSA, the information can merely have potential value,
rather than requiring actual value. 14 Consequently, negative trade secrets-
knowledge of what not to do-may be considered protectable under the
UTSA.15 Third, any valuable information meets the definition of a trade
secret for the UTSA, even information that only relates to a single event.
6
The UTSA has been adopted in some form by forty-two states and the
District of Columbia, but not in Pennsylvania. 7 Still, many courts follow
the guidelines of the Restatement (First) of Torts, despite their legislatures
having adopted the UTSA, because the definitions are so similar.
18
The most recent definition, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, published in 1995, defines a trade secret as "[a]ny
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others."' 9
All three trade secrets definitions emphasize good faith and fair
dealing. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and the UTSA
state that good faith and fair dealing are implied for both the employer and
the employee.2° Under the UTSA, misappropriation of a trade secret occurs
,,21when a trade secret is used or disclosed through "improper means.
Under the Restatement (First) of Torts and Pennsylvania law,
misappropriation of a trade secret occurs when
[o]ne who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without
privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the
11. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended 1985).
12. James Pooley, Trade Secrets, 10 L.J. PRESS § 2.04[2] at 2-32-33 (2003); Sheinfeld
& Konkel, supra note 3, at 427.
13. James Pooley, Trade Secrets, 10 L.J. PRESS § 2.04[2] at 2-33 (2003).
14. Id.
15. Id. For an illustration of the consequences of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
meeting the doctrine of negative trade secrets, see Hamler, supra note 10.
16. Hamler, supra note 10, at 387.
17. Sheinfeld & Konkel, supra note 3, at 428 (listing the state statutes that have adopted
the UTSA).
18. Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure,
67 U. CIN. L. REv. 809, 812-13 (1999) (citing JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN,
TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 8-9 (1998) and PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123 (4th ed. 1997)).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
20. Whaley, supra note 18, at 815.
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985).
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secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes
a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing
the secret to him.2
Thus, the Restatement (First) of Torts also stresses good faith and fair
dealing.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Trade secrets of a former employer can be protected by the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure when an employee will inevitably use or disclose
knowledge of such trade secrets in the course of new employment.23 A
plaintiff may be entitled to a preliminary injunction upon a showing that (1)
the former and new employers are competitors, (2) the employee's new
responsibilities are so similar to the former responsibilities that disclosure
of the former employer's trade secrets is inevitable, and finally, (3) the new
employer has not taken proper steps to ensure against misappropriation of
the trade secrets.24
The theory attempts to strike a balance between actual appropriation
of trade secrets and the mere possibility of such appropriation. While
actual appropriation is not required, to meet the doctrine, potential
appropriation is insufficient. 2' The principle demands the inevitability of
misappropriation and the presence of a real and imminent threat.26 The
former requirement has been harshly criticized, however, due to the
impossibility of consistently applying a term as vague as "inevitable. 27
The theory is also broad enough to cover instances in which restrictive
covenants or non-disclosure agreements do not exist.28 The effect is a
doctrine that acts as a non-competition agreement in cases where such an
agreement was never created. 29 The doctrine may also act to create a non-
disclosure agreement where one did not previously exist.30
22. First Health Group Corp. v. Nat'l Prescription Adm'rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194,
218 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939)).
23. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
24. Sheinfeld & Konkel, supra note 3, at 475.
25. Id. at 476.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Emmert, Comment, Keeping Confidence with Former
Employees: California Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade
Secret Law, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1198 (2000) (describing the "mixed reviews"
the inevitable disclosure doctrine has received); Hamler, supra note 10, at 396 (analyzing
the inconsistency in the interpretation and application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
28. Sheinfeld & Konkel, supra note 3, at 477.
29. Id.; Emmert, supra note 27, at 1202.
30. Keith A. Roberson, South Carolina's Inevitable Adoption of the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine: Balancing Protection of Trade Secrets with Freedom of Employment,
52 S.C. L. REV. 895, 898 (2001).
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A. PepsiCo v. Redmond
Though the doctrine of inevitable disclosure has existed for years, 3' it
has become much more prevalent in the wake of the Seventh Circuit case
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond.32 The battle in PepsiCo was waged between
beverage companies PepsiCo and Quaker.3  PepsiCo manufactured a
product called All Sport, a competitor of Quaker's product Gatorade.34
Defendant Redmond had worked for PepsiCo in its Pepsi-Cola North
America division for ten years, serving first as the general manager of the
northern California business unit, and later as the general manager for all of
California. 35 Redmond signed a confidentiality agreement with PepsiCo
providing that he would not disclose any confidential information relating
to company business.36
Redmond then began negotiations with Uzzi, the head of Quaker's
Gatorade division, regarding the possibility of Redmond becoming vice
president of on premise sales for Gatorade.37 Redmond did not inform
PepsiCo about his discussions with Uzzi. 38 In fact, even after Redmond
had accepted an offer to be the vice president of field operations for
Gatorade, Redmond told PepsiCo that he was merely debating whether or
not to accept an offer from Gatorade.39 Once Redmond revealed that he
was leaving PepsiCo to join Quaker, PepsiCo sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent him from working at Quaker and disclosing any
confidential information to Quaker.40 Emphasizing Redmond's bad faith,
the district court issued an order permanently enjoining Redmond from
using or disclosing any PepsiCo trade secrets or confidential information.41
PepsiCo appealed, arguing that in the course of his new employment
at Quaker, Redmond would inevitably disclose several trade secrets he had
42become privy to while at PepsiCo. PepsiCo claimed that this information
would give Quaker an unfair advantage.43 The Seventh Circuit agreed,
defining the doctrine of inevitable disclosure as applicable when "a
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
31. See Hamler, supra note 10, at 391-94 (recounting the earliest manifestations of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine).
32. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
33. Id. at 1263-64.
34. Id. at 1264.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1264-65.
41. Id. at 1267.
42. Id. at 1266.
43. Id.
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demonstrating that defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to
rely on the plaintiff's trade secrets." 44 Though there was no evidence that
Redmond took any physical materials from PepsiCo when he left, the court
found the situation to be a classic case of inevitable disclosure: "Redmond
cannot help but rely on [PepsiCo's] trade secrets ... [and] these secrets will
enable Quaker to achieve a substantial advantage. .. ."4' The court
analogized the case to a situation in which a team player leaves to join the
46opposing team right before the big game, taking the playbook with him.
Affirming the district court's injunction, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
several factors including: the existence of trade secrets, whether Redmond
had knowledge of these trade secrets, competition between PepsiCo and
Quaker, similarities between Redmond's new and former duties, and
Redmond's intent and bad faith.47 Regarding the district court's finding of
Redmond's intent to use PepsiCo's trade secrets as evidenced by his bad
faith, the Seventh Circuit did not find an abuse of discretion and placed less
emphasis on this aspect of the case. 48  The court found, however, that
Redmond's potential use of PepsiCo's trade secrets amounted to
"threatened misappropriation" under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. 49 Thus,
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure was reborn.
B. Cases Following PepsiCo
1. Merck v. Lyon
In the aftermath of PepsiCo, several other jurisdictions applied the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure. One such case, very similar to PepsiCo,
is Merck & Co. v. Lyon.50 This case involved a confidentiality agreement,
but not a non-competition agreement.5 Inevitable disclosure was found by
the court.52
Plaintiff Merck made prescription drugs available over the counter
before the patents for the prescriptions expired.53  Defendant Glaxo
44. Id. at 1269.
45. Id. at 1270.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1265-66, 1270-71.
48. Id. at 1270-71.
49. Id. at 1269. The Illinois Trade Secrets Act permits a court to enjoin either "actual
or threatened misappropriation" of trade secrets, provided that the party seeking the
injunction can show that a protectable trade secret exists and that misappropriation has
occurred. See id. at 1267-68.
50. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
5 1. Id. at 1454.
52. Id. at 1460 ("[S]ome misappropriation [of trade secrets] is likely").
53. Id. at 1446.
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Wellcome marketed these types of products, known as "switch products. 54
Lyon, an original defendant later dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction, worked for Merck for four years and was responsible for the
launch and marketing of Pepcid AC in Canada.55 Lyon had signed a
16confidentiality agreement with Merck. Lyon then accepted a position
with Glaxo to "oversee [over the counter] commercial activities outside the
Americas. 57 Multiple sources at Merck stated that Lyon did not admit to
Merck that he was going to a competitor, but in his deposition, Lyon
58claimed that he had admitted he was joining a competitor.
Balancing harms to determine whether an injunction was proper, the
court found that Merck could potentially suffer irreparable harm if trade
secrets were disclosed, whereas Glaxo would not suffer greatly if an
injunction was imposed.59  Under the North Carolina Trade Secret
Protections Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a trade secret,
as well as a legitimate threat of misappropriation. 60 The court found that
Merck had established a likelihood of success in proving the existence of
61
protectable trade secrets.
To determine Merck's likelihood of success regarding
misappropriation, the court held that even without bad faith, the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure is applicable in North Carolina where "[a] likelihood
of disclosure could be shown by the degree of similarity between the
employee's former and current position, and the value of the
information. 6 2  Other factors were borrowed from PepsiCo, such as
competition between the two employers, the new employer's efforts to
prevent the disclosure of the former employer's trade secrets, and fair
63
dealing. Applying these factors to Merck's situation, the court found that
misappropriation was likely due to the similar responsibilities held by Lyon
at Glaxo.64 The court found Lyon's lack of forthrightness to be a basis for a
narrow injunction, because the relevant trade secrets mostly concerned
54. Id. (explaining that switch products are "products that were once available only by
prescription, but are now or will be made available for over-the-counter purchase").
55. Id. at 1447.
56. Id. at 1454. The court found that Merck's failure to require Lyon to sign a non-
competition agreement was not unreasonable because Merck did not know Lyon was going
to a competitor. Id.
57. Id. at 1448.
58. Id. The court did not find Lyon's testimony credible. Id. Since Lyon would have
been denied his severance package if Merck had discovered he was going to a competitor,
the court considered this a possible reason for his dishonesty. Id. at 1448-49.
59. Id. at 1456.
60. Id. at 1456-57.
61. Id. at 1457.
62. Id. at 1460.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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general business information not necessarily unique to Glaxo.65
2. T-N-T Motorsports v. Hennessey Motorsports
Another notable inevitable disclosure case is T-N-T Motorsports, Inc.
v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc.66 In this case there were no confidentiality
or non-competition agreements, yet inevitable disclosure was still found. 67
Plaintiff Hennessey Motorsports specialized "in high performance
upgrades for a variety of vehicles., 68  Defendant Terpstra assisted
Hennessey in times of high demand.69 Terpstra ended his employment with
Hennessey without notice, and then began working full-time for T-N-T
Motorsports, which manufactured and designed products for Hennessey's
use in conjunction with the upgrades. 70 Terpstra then started advertising T-
N-T's own high performance upgrades, but at a lower price than that of
Hennessey' s.7
Hennessey claimed Terpstra learned trade secrets during his
employment with Hennessey, and the use of this information to directly
compete with Hennessey amounted to misappropriation. 7' Although there
was no covenant not to compete and no confidentiality agreement between
Terpstra and Hennessey, the court held that trade secrets might still be
protected if a confidential relationship existed between employer and
employee.73
The court held that Hennessey had shown a likelihood of success in
proving that it had protectable trade secrets that were misappropriated by
Terpstra.74  Despite the lack of non-disclosure or non-competition
agreements, "a former employee may not use, for his own advantage and to
the detriment of his former employer, confidential information or trade
secrets acquired by or imparted to him in the course of his employment. 75
The court found it likely that Terpstra would use Hennessey's trade secrets
in the course of his new employment, thus harming Hennessey so as to
76warrant an injunction.
65. Id. at 1461.
66. 965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App. 1998).
67. Id. at 22, 24.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 21.
73. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that a duty not to use confidential or proprietary
information "survives termination of employment").
74. Id. at 23-24.
75. Id. at 24.
76. The court held that the injunction issued by the lower court was overbroad and
affirmed a modified version of the injunction. Id. at 25.
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3. EarthWeb v. Schlack
In EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack,7 7 inevitable disclosure was not found in
a case that included both a confidentiality agreement and a covenant not to
compete.78 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that Plaintiff EarthWeb did not show sufficient irreparable harm to enjoin
the defendant from his new employment at EarthWeb's competitor.79
EarthWeb provides online products and services to information technology
professionals. 8° Defendant Schlack worked as one of ten vice presidents of
EarthWeb and was responsible for the content of its websites8 Schlack
had signed an employment agreement, which included a broad non-
disclosure agreement and a covenant not to compete.82  Schlack left
EarthWeb to work for ITworld.com, a subsidiary of the leading provider of
83print-based information technology. EarthWeb claimed that Schlack's
new position at ITworld.com would inevitably lead him to disclose
EarthWeb's trade secrets.84
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York described the history of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and
recognized that, if there is no actual misappropriation, the doctrine should
be applied only in rare cases.8' The district court listed several factors to
weigh when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief: whether the parties
are direct competitors, the similarities between the new and old jobs, the
value of the trade secrets, and the nature of the industry and of the trade
86secrets. The court found that protectable trade secrets existed, but that
EarthWeb did not show a risk of inevitable disclosure so as to warrant an
87injunction. While ITworld.com and EarthWeb both involve the
information technology market, Schlack's new responsibilities would not
involve matters relating to his former employment.18 The Second Circuit
affirmed this holding. 89
77. No. 99-9302, 2000 WL 1093320 (2d Cir. May 18, 2000).
78. EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); EarthWeb,
2000 WL 1093320, at *2.
79. EarthWeb, 2000 WL 1093320, at *2.
80. EarthWeb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
81. Id. at 303.
82. Id. at 306-07.
83. Id. at 303.
84. Id. at 307-08.
85. Id. at 309-10.
86. Id. at 310.
87. Id. at 314, 316.
88. Id. at 316.
89. EarthWeb v. Schlack, No. 99-9302, 2000 WL 1093320, at *3 (2d Cir. May 18,
2000).
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III. PENNSYLVANIA'S TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE
Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.
However, several cases that touched upon issues accompanying the
doctrine have shown the courts' reluctance to apply the policy.
A. Wexler v. Greenberg
Pennsylvania policy regarding the tension between employee mobility
and protection of employer's trade secrets was laid out in Wexler v.
Greenberg.90 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that trade secrets
could be protected if a confidential relationship existed between employee
and employer or if a restrictive covenant existed.9' To maintain its trade
secrets, an employer must show that there is a legally protectable trade
secret and that there is a legal basis for relief.
92
Buckingham Wax Company manufactured chemicals, and Defendant
Greenberg was their chief chemist for eight years.93  There was no
restrictive covenant between them.94 Greenberg eventually left and went to
work for Brite Products Company, a company that purchased from
Buckingham and sold a line of chemicals.95 When Greenberg joined Brite,
96the company expanded into manufacturing chemicals.
The issue facing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was whether a
confidential relationship existed between Greenberg and Buckingham such
that Greenberg could be prevented from disclosing Buckingham's trade
secrets to Brite.97 The court analyzed the policies that protect against unfair
competition and contrasted them with the policies protecting employee
mobility. 98 The court recognized the benefits of confidentiality and fair
competition but also acknowledged the notion of personal freedom and
equal bargaining positions:
[T]he optimum amount of "entrusting" will not occur unless the
risk of loss to the businessman through a breach of trust can be
held to a minimum. On the other hand, any form of post-
employment restraint reduces the economic mobility of
employees and limits their personal freedom to pursue a preferred
90. 160 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1960).
91. Id. at 433-34.
92. Id. at 434.
93. Id. at 431.
94. Id. at 432.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 434.
9R. Id. at 434-35
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course of livelihood. The employee's bargaining position is
weakened because he is potentially shackled by the acquisition of
alleged trade secrets; and thus, paradoxically, he is restrained,
because of his increased expertise, from advancing further in the
industry in which he is most productive. Moreover... society
suffers because competition is diminished by slackening the
dissemination of ideas, processes and methods.99
The court weighed the merits of both positions and decided that the
law favored employee mobility over protecting businesses from unfair
competition.100 Accordingly, a court should look to the reasonableness of
any restrictive covenant, or to any relationship when such an agreement
does not exist.'0 °
The court did not find that a confidential relationship existed between
Buckingham and Greenberg because Greenberg was not part of research or
experimentation at Buckingham.' ° 2  Therefore, there was no
misappropriation or improper disclosure of trade secrets.0 3
B. Air Products & Chemicals v. Johnson
Pennsylvania courts again dealt with inevitable disclosure in Air
Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson.'O The court of common pleas
issued an injunction to prevent inevitable disclosure of trade secrets, and
though the Superior Court of Pennsylvania did not expressly adopt this
language, they did not find reversible error.105
Air Products and Liquid Air were manufacturers and distributors of
industrial gases. 10 6 Defendant Johnson worked for Air Products for fifteen
years, starting out in charge of on-site sales and later becoming a vice
president. 10 7 Johnson then accepted a position with Liquid Air as president
of its Canadian subsidiary, a job that included overseeing Liquid Air's on-
site mode of delivery.
10 8
Air Products sought an injunction to prevent Johnson from disclosing
trade secrets involving "technical data concerning the methods of delivery
of on-site gas, status of negotiations with customers, and the analysis of
99. Id. at 435.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 436.
103. Id. at 436-37.
104. 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
105. Id. at 1124.
106. Id. at 1116.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1116-17.
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market opportunities. '1 ' 9 Though Johnson did not sign a covenant not to
compete, he had signed a confidentiality agreement with Air Products, and
the record indicated that Johnson's move to Liquid Air was in good faith. "
However, Air Products feared that Johnson would inevitably disclose
valuable trade secrets due to the nature of his new responsibilities at Liquid
Air." '
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that a confidential
relationship existed between Johnson and Air Products, and Air Products'
information of which Johnson had knowledge amounted to trade secrets
under the Restatement (First) of Torts § 757."' Regarding the lower
court's determination that "[i]t would be impossible [for Johnson] to
perform his managerial functions in on-site work without drawing on
knowledge he possesses of Air Products' confidential information," the
Superior Court stated that it did not "adopt the reasoning of the trial court
or its use of the term inevitable," though the lower court's "determination
of the likelihood of disclosure was proper."' 13
C. SI Handling Systems v. Heisley
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in SI
Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley14 recognized that trade secrets may be
protected by an injunction, but they did not find the scope of the district
court's injunction to be proper. 15 Therefore, they remanded the injunction
to the district court to reconsider its finding of inevitable disclosure.'
1 6
Plaintiff SI Handling Systems made machines to transport materials
between warehouses or factories." 7 One of SI's product lines was called
"CARTRAC."" 8 It was very valuable to competitors because its unique
features distinguished it from other car-on-track systems." 9 SI sells the
CARTRAC system to General Motors."O SI took several measures to
maintain CARTRAC's secrecy, including limiting the information given to
GM regarding CARTRAC's operation and maintenance.'
2'
Defendant Heisley was SI's president for approximately five years
109. Id. at 1117.
110. Id. at 1117-18,1120.
111. Id. at 1117.
112. Id. at 1120-22.
113. Id. at 1124 (alteration in original).
114. 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 1265.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1248-49.
118. Id. at 1249.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1250.
121. Id. at 1250-51.
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before leaving to form Heico, Inc. 122  Defendant Dentner, SI's vice
president of operations and the "father" of CARTRAC, also left SI.
123
Together, the defendants and other former SI employees developed
ROBOTRAC, a car-on-track system based largely on CARTRAC.124 The
prospectus for ROBOTRAC stated that "[a]lmost all of the senior
management personnel from SI Handling, who developed [CARTRAC],
are part of the ROBOTRAC team.'1 2' The ROBOTRAC team targeted
GM, and they attempted to invent around CARTRAC's patent.
126
SI filed suit against defendants for several claims, including
117misappropriation of trade secrets. SI moved for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin the use and disclosure of its trade secrets. 28 The district court
granted SI's motion for a preliminary injunction, and defendants
appealed.
29
The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the preliminary injunction
stating that it was too vague and broad in scope. 30 Applying the
Restatement (First) of Torts, the court affirmed and reversed several of the
lower court's findings concerning SI's trade secrets.13 The court weighed
the factors for a preliminary injunction and held that SI had made a
showing of irreparable harm without the injunction, and public policy
supported injunctions to protect trade secrets. 132  Regarding inevitable
disclosure, however, the Third Circuit held that the lower court's injunction
was too broad because it was "predicated on erroneous legal
conclusions."'' 33 Therefore, the court vacated the order and remanded the
case for modification.
34
IV. PENNSYLVANIA'S RELUCTANCE TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
It is evident from case law that Pennsylvania recognizes the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure, but is determined to apply it narrowly.
122. Id. at 1251.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1252.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1254.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1248.
131. Id. at 1263.
132. Id. at 1263-65 (considering the following factors to determine whether or not to
grant a preliminary injunction: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant if relief is
denied; (2) the balance of harms; and (3) the public interest").
133. Id. at 1266.
134. Id.
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Pennsylvania strongly favors employee mobility, and while the state
acknowledges protection of employer trade secrets, it is not yet willing to
broadly apply a policy that will severely hamper employees' freedom.
A. Pennsylvania Employment Laws and Public Policy
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld employee mobility over
the protection of employer trade secrets in Wexler.'35 This precedent
affects all employment law in Pennsylvania. Wexler sets a very strong pro-
employee tone, and through its language, it seems clear that Pennsylvania
is unwilling to hinder employees' freedom of contract: "We must therefore
be particularly mindful of any effect our decision in this case might have in
disrupting this pattern of employee mobility, both in view of possible
restraints upon an individual in the pursuit of his livelihood and the harm to
the public .... Since the doctrine of inevitable disclosure often acts in
place of non-disclosure or non-competition covenants, Pennsylvania courts
are appropriately hesitant when applying it.
Further evidence of Pennsylvania's unwillingness to apply the policy
of inevitable disclosure is Pennsylvania's refusal to adopt the UTSA. The
UTSA is more favorable to employers, since it covers a broader range of
trade secrets than the Restatement (First) of Torts does. As
aforementioned, the UTSA includes trade secrets that are not in use as well
as trade secrets with mere potential but not necessarily actual value.'37
Thus, a state legislature's adoption of the UTSA expresses a readiness to
give greater protection to employers.
However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Air Products
demonstrates sound recognition and adoption of the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, and it has been interpreted as such.'38 Applying Pennsylvania
law, the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that "this Court may enjoin [a
defendant's] employment in that capacity under the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure," citing PepsiCo and Air Products.13 9 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania noted that Pennsylvania allows for an injunction in the case
of inevitable disclosure.140 Nevertheless, neither court found inevitable
135. Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 437 (Pa. 1960).
136. Id. at 433.
137. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985).
138. See Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual States' Application
of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621, 635
(2002) (noting that Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in Air
Products).
139. First Health Group Corp. v. Nat'l. Prescription Adm'rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194,
236 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
140. Oberg Indus., Inc. v. Finney, 555 A.2d 1324, 1326-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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disclosure on the facts of those cases.' 4' These holdings again emphasize
Pennsylvania's reluctance to apply the doctrine.
B. Pennsylvania's Version of Inevitable Disclosure
Pennsylvania's version of inevitable disclosure does not vary greatly
from the doctrine laid out in PepsiCo. In order for a Pennsylvania court to
apply the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, both a confidential relationship
and highly valuable information must be present.
As laid out in Wexler, a court will look to a confidential relationship
first and foremost. This step was evident in Air Products, as the court laid
out the entire confidentiality agreement between Johnson and Air
Products. 14 In SI Handling, the court detailed the measures that SI took to
maintain the secrecy of the CARTRAC product information. 143  If a
confidential relationship does not exist, the court is not likely to apply the
doctrine.'44
The other condition that a Pennsylvania court will look at is the value
of the trade secret. The trade secret must be protectable under the
Restatement (First) of Torts adopted by Pennsylvania. 45  General
knowledge or skill will not qualify.
146
However, Pennsylvania courts do not necessarily require that a
restrictive covenant be in place. In Air Products, there was no covenant not
to compete.14 7 Nor was there one in Wexler. 14 Thus, it appears that while
Pennsylvania may not apply the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to replace
non-disclosure agreements, Pennsylvania may apply it to replace non-
competition agreements.
C. How Inevitable Disclosure May Negatively Affect Pennsylvania
Employees
Pennsylvania's adoption of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure means
that employers have an increased likelihood of obtaining an injunction,
141. First Health, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 237; Oberg, 555 A.2d at 1327.
142. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1117 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982).
143. SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (3d. Cir. 1985).
144. See Oberg, 555 A.2d at 1327 (emphasizing the absence of a restrictive covenant or
a confidential relationship).
145. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa. 1960) (listing the first of the
employer's burdens as showing the presence of a "legally protectable trade secret").
146. See Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1121-22 (delineating the difference between general
information and trade secrets); Sl Handling, 753 F.2d at 1255 (noting that public knowledge
is not protectable under trade secret law).
147. Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1119.
148. Wexler, 160 A.2d at 432.
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regardless of whether a restrictive covenant exists. Though Pennsylvania
precedent clearly favors employee mobility, inevitable disclosure is a step
toward greater leniency for employers. Still, since the Pennsylvania courts
seem so reluctant to apply the doctrine, it is not a major victory for
employers yet. It is presently unclear whether or not Pennsylvania will
broaden its application of the policy.
Employees in Pennsylvania may be hurt by the doctrine in two major
ways. One is that the doctrine can be used to create a de facto covenant not
to compete. As stated earlier, Pennsylvania courts seem willing to apply
the doctrine when a non-competition agreement does not exist. This
enables the employer to be slack in their contracting process with their
employees, because the employer has the added safeguard of resorting to
litigation under inevitable disclosure once the employee leaves to work for
a competitor. The second problem for employees is that the doctrine may
be used by employers to buy time, especially in technology industries. In
the name of inevitable disclosure, employers are able to wait until their
product becomes surpassed by more advanced technology, and in the
meantime they restrain their employees from disclosing trade secrets.
Furthermore, these problems are exacerbated by a weak economy as
more employees find themselves out of work. 149 This leads to increased
litigation when employees attempt to get out of covenants not to compete,
and employers scramble to protect their trade secrets when these employees
go to work for their competitors. 150
1. The Doctrine as a De Facto Covenant Not to Compete
Pennsylvania courts have applied the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
in place of non-competition agreements."' By using the doctrine as a de
facto covenant not to compete, employers are let off the hook if they did
not properly protect their trade secrets or their confidential relationships
with their employees. A hastily drafted employment contract omitting a
covenant not to compete becomes less important if an employer
successfully argues for an injunction to prevent inevitable disclosure. As a
result, Pennsylvania employers may become more lax in their hiring
152processes.
149. Due to layoffs, cutbacks, and downsizing, employees are more likely to be out of a
job or looking for a better one. See Thomas W. Brooke, Trade Secret Protection Through
Internal Policies and Employment Agreements, 9 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 9, Sept. 2001.
150. See id. ("A slower economy often means more litigation as companies in trouble are
willing to turn to the courts to curtail the activities of competitors, especially competitors
who hire former employers.").
151. See Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1119, 1122.
152. As a partner in the employment law group of Morris, Manning & Martin in Atlanta
stated, "We're seeing more companies using this doctrine, especially when they don't have
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If Pennsylvania courts impose an injunction under inevitable
disclosure in cases where there is no non-competition agreement, they are
essentially writing one. This judicial rewriting severely hampers employee
bargaining power and allows the employer to reap "the benefit of a
contractual provision it did not pay for."15 3 It gives the former employer all
the bargaining power in negotiations with the employee, because whether
or not the employer seeks a covenant not to compete, the employer can
simply seek one that is judicially crafted after the employee leaves to work
for a competitor.
Giving the employer so much dominance over the employee in the
contractual setting can only lead to employer laziness. It creates an
incentive for employers to be lackadaisical in their hiring process, because
they still have the safety net of employing the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure as a tactic to protect their trade secrets. With its increased
popularity in recent years, employers are aware of the doctrine and what it
can do for them, and therefore are not afraid of using it to their advantage.
These consequences of the doctrine harm employees even more when
combined with Pennsylvania's nominal support of covenants not to
compete. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "an employer
who fears this kind of future competition must protect himself by a
preventative contract with his employee."' 5 4 Consequently, a specialized
employee is placed in a difficult position after leaving an employer.
If an employer wishes to prevent litigation involving the possibility of
inevitable disclosure, the employer should be careful to limit disclosure of
trade secrets. It is imperative that protectable trade secrets are disclosed
only to employees who require such information. Trade secrets should be
labeled as confidential so that employees are aware of their classified
nature.
Employers should also use the termination process to their advantage
to prevent inevitable disclosure. At an exit interview, the employee should
be reminded of trade secrets and any covenants not to compete or non-
disclosure agreements. An employer should also obtain information
regarding the employee's future employment, including job
responsibilities. If an employee is not upfront about where he or she will
be employed, this may be useful as evidence of bad faith in the instance of
later litigation.
an employment agreement or restrictive covenant with the former employee." Tammy
Joyner, Fired Workers Fight Firms' Restriction-Suits Growing: Employees Try to Resist
Companies Limiting Where They Can Work in New Jobs, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 26,
2001, at DI, D4. There is no reason to believe this will not happen in Pennsylvania as well.
153. Matheson, supra note 6, at 160.
154. SI Handling Sys., v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1259 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Spring
Steels v. Molloy, 162 A.2d 370, 375 (Pa. 1960)).
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Armed with these protections for employers' trade secrets, the
additional application of inevitable disclosure becomes dangerous.'55
Employers are already able to protect their trade secrets in a prophylactic
manner by negotiating covenants not to compete, limiting access to trade
secrets, or using exit interviews to remind employees about restrictive
covenants and agreements not to disclose confidential information.
Pennsylvania employers should not be given an incentive to ignore such
measures by using inevitable disclosure.
2. Using the Doctrine to Buy Time in Litigation
The doctrine can easily become a litigation tactic in the technological
industries in Pennsylvania, for which time is essential. For example, an
employer may want to protect trade secrets while a product is valuable and
on the market. In a short period of time, however, the employer's product
will become outdated by technological advances. Therefore, the employer
needs only to bide time, waiting until the product is no longer the hottest
product on the market. In the meantime, the employer can use the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure as a basis for litigation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order to prevent an employee from
leaving for a competitor.'56 While the litigation is pending, the employee is
out of work and out of money, and the employer is patiently waiting for
market forces to make the litigation pointless. For instance, an employer
might exploit the key moment right before the employee begins work with
the new employer. 157
155. As Judge Pauley in the Southern District of New York said when deciding
Earth Web:
[The doctrine's] application is fraught with hazards. Among these risks is the
imperceptible shift in bargaining power that necessarily occurs upon the
commencement of an employment relationship marked by the execution of a
confidentiality agreement. When that relationship eventually ends, the parties'
confidentiality agreement may be wielded as a restrictive covenant, depending
on how the employer views the new jobs its former employee has accepted.
This can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an employer; the risk of
litigation alone may have a chilling effect on the employee. Such constraints
should be the product of open negotiation.
EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). This is an incredibly
strong denunciation of inevitable disclosure, as the term "chilling effect" is generally
reserved for areas of constitutional law such as free speech. See generally Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (stating that content-based regulations of speech raise "special
First Amendment concerns because of [their] obvious chilling effect on free speech").
156. See Sheinfeld & Konkel, supra note 3, at 504-06 (listing cases in which the
employer sought a TRO as a tactical weapon).
157. See id. (citing to FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir. 1982)
(granting an employer a TRO four days before an employee began work with the new
employer).
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This time tactic was described in an interview with representatives
from several corporations, including VoiceStream Wireless and Quest
Diagnostics.'58 During the discussion about protecting trade secrets
through the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the senior vice president and
general counsel of Valley National Bank said, "[S]ometimes even if you
ultimately lose, you still win because you've gotten yourself time, simply
gotten time through temporary restraining orders, for example, even if you
end up negotiating a settlement or losing a case. You've gained yourself
enough time to solve the problem you were facing."'5 9 In response, the
moderator of the interview said, "Or for that generation of DSL circuits to
become last year's circuits?"' 6  The general counsel and secretary for
Globespan answered, "Yes.''
Inevitable disclosure can thus become a brilliant litigation tool for
employers in Pennsylvania, especially for those in the technological fields,
to bide time until their product no longer requires such ardent protection.
162
But this tactic leaves employees with the short end of the stick. Most
likely, an individual employee will have difficulty obtaining money to pay
for an attorney and the other costs involved in litigation, whereas an
employer usually does not have these financial hurdles. Add to that the
fact that the employee is now without a job because he or she is
temporarily restrained from working for the new employer and is no longer
working for the litigious former employer either. This can all be incredibly
devastating to an individual employee, and yet the former employer is
hardly inconvenienced.
Some opponents of inevitable disclosure take this argument even
further and claim that such abuse will lead to a paucity of competition as
well as a lack of new development in technological areas. "If employees
are threatened and consequently fail to acquire more skills or develop better
ideas, society might feel the repercussions of this behavior through slowed
competition and the lack of interchange of ideas, processes, and
methods. . . economic growth will decline... [and] may stagnate.' 63 This
argument is prevalent in many technologically related debates, such as the
deliberation regarding the open nature of the development of the Internet,
158. From Money Laundering to Sex Harrassment, Corporate Counsels Confront New
Challenges, 14 Bus. NEWS N.J. 47 (2001).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Matheson, supra note 6, at 161 (stating that employers have an incentive to seek
injunctive relief because it is such a fact-intensive and fact-specific process that even if the
employer loses the litigation, "the former employer has hampered the former employee and
the new employer through the cloud of the litigation process").
163. Whaley, supra note 18, at 844.
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as well as the ongoing dispute about open source software.
64
While this argument sounds plausible in the context of inevitable
disclosure, it is inconsistent with the way Pennsylvania courts have been
applying the doctrine. Pennsylvania courts seem to recognize the
implications of the doctrine and have thus been reluctant to apply it.
Therefore, it is unlikely that competition and industry development in
Pennsylvania will be stifled because of inevitable disclosure. And even if
Pennsylvania increasingly applies the doctrine, it still seems like somewhat
of a stretch to predict that the doctrine will impair competition and industry
development. Antitrust law can probably solve any major anticompetitive
effects the doctrine might cause.
But the fact remains that inevitable disclosure is a devastating
litigation weapon against individual employees. Employees have a paucity
of economic resources and are no match for employers who utilize
litigation tactics such as abusing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to buy
time. This imbalance creates an incentive for employers to abuse the legal
process to their advantage. As this country is already notoriously litigious,
no further incentives to seek out lawsuits are necessary. This abuse surely
does not reflect the original intent of inevitable disclosure, a doctrine that
purportedly seeks to protect employer trade secrets via intellectual property
law. The doctrine thus has a negative by-product when it generates such
tactical litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure in Pennsylvania has shifted
Pennsylvania policy slightly away from favoring employee mobility and
freedom. Pennsylvania courts, however, are not yet ready to make the shift
complete. They are still reluctant to give up pro-employee policies.
Consequently, they have struck a balance by adopting the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure while severely limiting its application.
It is probable that over time Pennsylvania will continue to lean toward
164. It is believed that the Internet would not have developed as rapidly as it did had it
not been developed with open standards. See Sharon Eisner Gillett & Mitchell Kapor, The
Self-Governing Internet: Coordination by Design, Prepared for Coordination and
Administration of the Internet: Workshop at Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Sept. 8-10, 1996, reprinted in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 3, 9 (Brian Kahin &
James H. Keller eds., 1997). Proponents of open source software similarly argue that
technology can advance when software codes are made available to the public. They argue
that intellectual property regulations can stifle and cripple development. See Richard
Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, in COMPUTERS, ETHICS, AND SOCIAL VALUES
(Deborah Johnson & Helen Nissenbaum eds., 1995) reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
MORAL, LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 283, 290-91 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997).
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favoring employers and protecting their trade secrets.165 Eventually,
Pennsylvania may use inevitable disclosure more often and more broadly,
resulting in the further erosion of employee rights. Employees might
receive increasingly less protection from Pennsylvania courts, as they have
in other states.
On one hand, employees are faced with a difficult predicament in light
of inevitable disclosure, especially those employees with specialized
training and access to confidential trade secrets. On the other hand,
employers are better off with the doctrine in place. Employers are given
more latitude in their hiring processes and are provided with a safety net in
case of contracting mistakes or errors. Employers certainly need trade
secret protection. 66 But do they need so much more protection at the cost
of so much more harm to employees?
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure should continue to be hesitantly
applied in Pennsylvania. As Pennsylvania courts seem willing to apply the
doctrine in cases in which there is no non-competition agreement in place,
employees are hampered in the bargaining process when the doctrine
creates a de facto covenant not to compete. Furthermore, Pennsylvania
employers in technological industries are able to use the doctrine as a
litigation tactic to bide time to wait out market forces.
It is unclear what the future of employment law in Pennsylvania will
look like. It is clear, however, that the doctrine of inevitable disclosure has
already altered the face of employment law in Pennsylvania and will
continue to do so at the rate it is going.
165. See Treadway, supra note 138, at 635 ("Predictions about Pennsylvania's future
treatment of inevitable disclosure are uncertain but appear favorable.").
166. According to the American Society for Industrial Security, Fortune 1000 companies
lost more than $45 billion in 1999 due to trade secret disclosures. See Joyner, supra note
152.
